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Abstract  
It is still an open issue of designing and adapting (data-driven) decision support systems and data 
warehouses to determine relevant content and in particular (performance) measures. In fact, some 
classic approaches to information requirements determination such as Rockart’s critical success 
factors method help with structuring decision makers’ information requirements and identifying 
thematically appropriate measures. In many cases, however, it remains unclear which and how many 
measures should eventually be used. Therefore, an optimization model is presented that integrates 
informational and economic objectives. The model incorporates (statistic) interdependencies among 
measures – i. e. the information they provide about one another –, decision makers’ and reporting 
tools’ ability of coping with information complexity as well as negative economic effects due to 
measure selection and usage. We show that in general the selection policies of all-or-none or the-
more-the-better are not reasonable although they are often conducted in business practice. Finally, 
the model’s application is illustrated by the German business-to-business sales organization of a 
global electronics and electrical engineering company as example. 
Keywords: decision support systems, information overload, critical success factors, design research. 
 
 
1 MOTIVATION AND OBJECT OF RESEARCH 
Due to the complexity of intra- and extraorganizational structures, it is impossible for decision makers 
in general – and executives in particular – to continuously monitor all fields of action that possibly 
require intervention. With reports containing in average up to 15,000 data points based on measures, 
i. e. key figures or (performance) indicators, information proliferation makes it even harder to focus on 
decision-relevant information (Axson 2007). Some measures more or less significantly influence the 
complexity of reports and the amount of time needed to understand them. The number of measures 
also drives the costs for customizing and maintaining reports. Hence, a central problem in the design 
and adaptation of (data-driven) decision support systems (DSS) and data warehouses (Alter 1980, 
Inmon 2005) still is to determine relevant fields of action and to select appropriate measures (Eccles 
1991, Watson et al. 1993). Particularly the latter requires formal research (Evans 2004). 
Some classic approaches to information requirements determination (IRD), such as Rockart’s critical 
success factors (CSFs) method (1979), provide valuable assistance with structuring decision makers’ 
information requirements (IR) and identifying thematically appropriate measures. However, these 
measures are often too many and it is unclear which should eventually be used. In this respect, 
decision makers’ cognitive restrictions (Browne et al. 2002, Davis 1982), limitations of reporting tools 
such as management cockpits and dashboards (Sisfontes-Monge 2007), and negative monetary 
implications need to be considered. As for measure selection in particular, there are additional 
deficiencies with respect to whether the selection process is intersubjectively comprehensible, decision 
makers can participate systematically, and (statistic) interdependencies among measures (e. g. 
quantifiable by means of correlation or contingency coefficients) are considered. In business practice, 
these deficiencies can result in that measure selection is based on “gut instinct”, that many time-
consuming interviews are conducted, and that the utility of selected measures remains doubtful. 
Therefore, the research question is: Which and how many measures shall be selected from a 
preselected set of thematically appropriate measures in order to provide decision makers with optimal 
information as regards informational and economic objectives?  
The paper relies on a design-oriented, formal, and deductive approach (Hevner et al. 2004). Section 2 
compares existing approaches with respect to general requirements and identifies the research gap. 
Section 3 proposes an optimization model as artifact. Section 4 evaluates the optimization model by 
illustrating its application in business practice and by assessing how it meets the general requirements 
outlined above. Section 5 summarizes the results and points out future research. 
2 RELATED WORK  
Currently, measures are often contained in performance measurement systems (PMS). In management 
accounting and operations management literature, there is a range of requirements on PMS (e. g. 
Artley et al. 2001, Caplice et al. 1995, Neely et al. 1995). Accordingly, PMS are expected to capture 
all relevant constituencies of a specific field of action (completeness, R.1), to encompass a manageable 
amount of measures (clarity, R.2), and to transfer the overall business strategy to decision makers 
(vertical integration, R.3). The process of measure selection should be intersubjectively 
comprehensible (intersubjectivity, R.4), consider (statistic) interdependencies among measures 
(interdependencies, R.5), and involve domain experts (participation, R.6). Although the requirements 
are somehow vague due to prosaic formulation, the author considers that they provide basic assistance 
with comparing existing approaches and with identifying the research gap (see Table 1 where 
completeness is omitted as it is not addressed by any approach). 
In the following, selected approaches from international journals and textbooks are presented. Due to 
space restrictions, this is done briefly. Giorgini et al. (2008) present a goal-oriented approach to 
determine IR for data warehouses that considers the organizational environment and decision makers’ 
needs. Neely et al. (2000) advocate a selection of measures in terms of a cost-benefit-analysis. 
Liebetruth et al. (2006) present a linear optimization model with which a utility-optimal subset of 
measures can be chosen from a set of preselected and thematically appropriate measures. Rockart 
(1979) shows how decision makers’ IR can be structured and reduced to a few essential fields of 
action, the so-called CSFs, each of which is monitored by several measures (see also Leidecker et al. 
1984). Axson (2007) extends CSFs analysis by incorporating additional interactive elements, 
distinguishing primary and supporting measures as well as vaguely postulating “minimal confusion”.  
The following findings are noteworthy: Almost all approaches neglect clarity (R.2) as they do not 
specify how many measures are to be selected. One approach allows to set a maximum number of 
measures. This is arbitrary and considers neither the decision makers’ information processing capacity 
nor economic implications. All approaches are vertically integrated by linking measures with CSFs, 
business strategy, or goals (R.3). Moreover, measure selection is (at least) partially subjective (R.4). 
Interdependencies among measures are not considered (R.5). Most approaches involve decision 
makers by means of explorative elements (e. g. interviews or games) (R.6). Summing up, there is a 
primary research gap with respect to clarity (R.2) and interdependencies (R.5). Furthermore, there still 
is potential for improvement with respect to intersubjectivity (R.4) and participation (R.6).  
We focus on the primary research gap. In the end, this will also ameliorate the other requirements. We 
adopt the ideas of optimization and preselection of thematically appropriate measures from Liebetruth 
et al. (2006), the structuring momentum of CSFs from Rockart (1979), and the idea of explicitly 
incorporating negative economic implications from Neely et al. (2000). Our contribution is that we 
formally address the trade-off between provided information, information complexity, and negative 
economic implications to determine which and how many measures should be selected optimally. 
3 AN OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR MEASURE SELECTION  
Consider a company where the reporting has historically grown and multiple (data-driven) DSS and 
data warehouses are in use. In order to react on its decision makers’ demand for clear information, the 
company launches a project for implementing a consolidated DSS. Two essential steps in this project 
are: (1) structuring the decision makers’ IR into relevant fields of action and (2) (pre-)selecting 
thematically appropriate measures from the existing systems – assuming no new measures will be 
added. In most cases, it will not be reasonable to integrate all preselected measures – nor even only 
those desired by the decision makers (e. g. Ackoff 1967, Davis 1982). This is for several reasons: 
some measures may (partially) “overlap” due to (statistic) interdependencies, decision makers can 
only cope with restricted information complexity, and customizing as well as maintaining reporting 
tools is expensive. It is advisable to analyze in advance which fraction of the preselected measures the 
consolidated DSS should contain. Whereas above thematically appropriate measures had to be (pre-) 
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Table 1. Comparison of existing approaches to measure selection 
selected, here measures are of interest that together provide much information about other measures. 
As indicated, two perspectives are important here: the economic and the informational perspective. 
While the former is indispensable when investing in IT, the latter is necessary as DSS primarily aim at 
supporting decision processes by supplying decision-relevant information (e. g. Power 2002).  
In order to determine the optimal fraction of measures, we propose an optimization model. Though 
being inherently discrete, the problem of measure selection can be interpreted as approx. continuous 
for sufficiently many measures. This allows to determine algebraic solutions and to gain general 
insights. We maintain the affiliation with the original problem setting and make reasoning about 
functions more illustrative by using discrete examples. A basic model for the informational 
perspective is proposed in section 3.1 and extended by the economic perspective in section 3.2. 
3.1 A basic model for the informational perspective 
Let us first consider the informational perspective where information has no price. Selecting one of the 
preselected measures provides information about the measure itself – as it becomes known – and about 
non-selected measures – due to (statistic) interdependencies. This creates informational utility. The 
more strongly a measure interdepends with non-selected measures, the more informational utility it 
creates. This is because a stronger interdependency allows to estimate values more reliably. There are 
also negative informational effects of selecting measures. Due to increasing information complexity, 
each additional measure makes it harder to cognitively process the entire amount of information. This 
creates informational disutility. Thus, there is an informational trade-off. The question is: Up to which 
optimal fraction of measures does the utility due to more information justify the disutility due to 
higher information complexity? The optimization model relies on the following assumptions: 
A.1: There is a given finite set of measures that have been preselected ex ante with respect to 
thematic appropriateness. Between some measures there are meaningfully interpretable 
pairwise (statistic) interdependencies, that is, selected measures provide information about (the 
values of) non-selected measures. All measures together satisfy the decision makers’ 
information requirements and provide complete information. Moreover, all measures together 
cause highest complexity. 
A.2: The fraction of the preselected measures that will be integrated into the consolidated DSS, 
x ∈ [0;1], is infinitely divisible (see discussion above). With x = 0, no measures are selected. 
With x = 1, all measures are selected. 
A.3: Uinfo(x) represents the informational utility due to the information that a fraction of selected 
measures provides about itself and non-selected measures. Dinfo(x) represents the informational 
disutility due to information complexity. Both are functions of x and can be forecast ex ante.  
On these assumptions, the informationally optimal fraction of measures xoptinfo can be determined by 
optimizing the difference between Uinfo(x) with Dinfo(x). This difference is also called informational net 
utility Uinfo,net(x). The corresponding objective function is given by: 
 Uinfo,net(x) = Uinfo(x) - Dinfo(x) = max! (1) 
In order to formalize the optimization model, Uinfo(x) and Dinfo(x) are examined. We start with Uinfo(x). 
If a (rational) decision maker were restricted to select only one measure, he would select the measure 
with the highest individual informational utility – say m1 –, i. e. the measure that in sum interdepends 
most strongly with the non-selected measures. If the decision maker were allowed to select two 
measures, he would take those that create the highest joint informational utility – say m2 and m3. In 
general, this joint informational utility is higher than the individual utility of m1. This is because either 
m1 is kept (as m2 or m3) and another measure is added or m1 is discarded and two other measures with 
higher joint utility are chosen. The only exception is if all measures interdepend perfectly. In this case 
already one measure alone – no matter which – provides complete information. In general, the joint 
informational utility of m2 and m3 is smaller than the sum of both individual utility values. This is 
because interdependencies cause “informational overlap”. To put it more precisely: If we only 
consider m2 and m3, the joint utility of knowing both m2 and m3 is smaller than the sum of the 
individual utility values due to knowing m2 (or m3) and its interdependency with m3 (or m2). If m2 and 
m3 interdepend, m2 provides information about m3 – and vice versa. The only exception is if m2 and m3 
are (statistically) independent of each other. In this case, the joint utility equals the sum of both 
individual utility values. If we consider all non-selected measures, the joint interdependency-induced 
utility of m2 and m3 is smaller than the sum of the individual interdependency-induced utility values of 
m2 and m3. For each non-selected measure, the strongest interdependency will be used to estimate its 
value. The only exception is if m2 and m3 are independent of all non-selected measures or interdepend 
with disjoint subsets of non-selected measures. With many measures at hand, this is rather unlikely. 
Hence, the marginal utility of selecting m2 and m3 (two measures) compared to selecting m1 (one 
measure) is smaller than (and exceptionally equal to) the marginal utility of selecting m1 (one measure) 
compared to selecting zero measures. This holds for any number of measures. Hence, the more 
measures are selected – i. e. the higher x is –, the higher is the joint informational utility and the less is 
the marginal utility. In mathematical terms, Uinfo(x) is increasing (∂(Uinfo(x))/∂x≤0) and concave 
(∂2(Uinfo(x))/∂x2≤0). If we neglect the discussed exceptions and treat Uinfo(x) as strictly increasing and 
concave, it may be formalized in a simplifying manner as follows: 
 Uinfo(x) = xα⋅A with α ∈ ]0;1] and A ∈ IR+  (2) 
Selecting no measures provides no information (Uinfo(0) = 0), whereas – according to A.1 – selecting 
all measures provides complete information (Uinfo(1) = A). The constant A represents the decision 
makers’ present-value monetary equivalent of complete information, that is, the amount of money they 
are willing to pay at the moment of measure selection for complete information during the planning 
horizon, i. e. as long as the selected measures are in use. Reasoning from an informational perspective, 
A represents the value of information by itself. It does not incorporate payments e. g. for data 
collection. The transformation into monetary units enables to integrate the economic perspective later. 
The diminishing marginal utility, which was introduced above and is caused by a higher fraction of 
measures, is formalized by the fact that the exponent α is restricted to ]0;1]. This also excludes the 
case where all measures interdepend perfectly, which would lead to a non-realistic course of Uinfo(x). A 
value of α close to 0 is appropriate if all preselected measures interdepend rather strongly. Therefore, 
very few measures already create almost complete information. A value of α close to 1 is appropriate 
if all measures are rather independent, that is, the marginal utility is rather constant. A mean value of α 
indicates that the measures split into several groups with strong intra-group and weak inter-group 
interdependencies. The higher the value of α, the more (and the smaller) groups tend to exist.  
The objective function’s second component represents the disutility created by information complexity 
Dinfo(x). It intuitively holds that the more measures are selected, the more complex is it to cognitively 
process them. Mathematically spoken, Dinfo(x) increases with x. According to cognitive sciences (e. g. 
Duncan 1980, Miller 1956), the amount of information becomes overproportionally more complex 
when the fraction of measures increases. Hence, a higher fraction x is also characterized by an 
increasing marginal disutility with respect to Dinfo(x). In summary, Dinfo(x) is strictly increasing 
(∂(Dinfo(x))/∂x>0) and strictly convex (∂2(Dinfo(x))/∂x2>0). This can be formalized as follows: 
 Dinfo(x) = xβ⋅B with β ∈ ]1;∞[ and B ∈ IR+ (3) 
Selecting no measures does not lead to complexity (Dinfo(0) = 0), whereas – according to A.1 – 
selecting all measures leads to highest complexity (Dinfo(1) = B). The constant B represents the 
decision makers’ present-value monetary equivalent of understanding complete information during the 
planning horizon. The increasing marginal disutility, which was introduced above and is caused by a 
higher fraction of measures, is formalized by the fact that the exponent β is restricted to ]1;∞[. Its 
value depends on the decision makers’ and employed reporting tools’ ability of coping with 
information complexity1. A value close to 1 is appropriate if the decision makers already have serious 
problems with processing few measures and/or the employed reporting tools are restricted to a few 
measures. The higher the value of β, the less decision makers are susceptible to information 
complexity and/or the more powerful are the employed reporting tools. Based on (1) to (3), the 
optimization model is as follows: 
 Maximize Uinfo,net(x) = Uinfo(x) - Dinfo(x) = xα⋅A - xβ⋅B  
 w. r. t. x ∈ [0;1] (4) 
A mathematical analysis shows that Uinfo,net(x) strictly increases until x*info = [(A⋅α)/(B⋅β)]1/(β-α). Up to 
that fraction, each additional measure provides more additional information than it causes additional 
complexity. Beyond, Uinfo,net(x) strictly decreases. Each additional measure then causes more additional 
complexity than it provides additional information. As x is restricted to [0;1], the optimal fraction is 
xoptinfo = min{x*info;1}. Due to the concave course of Uinfo,net(x), a border solution such as xoptinfo = 1 only 
occurs on rare occasions (see below).  
Two interesting questions are: How is the decision makers’ attitude towards complete information and 
highest complexity reflected in A and B? How do both parameters ceteris paribus affect the course of 
Uinfo,net(x) and the position of xoptinfo? The following case differentiation is also depicted in Figure 1. If 
A = B, complete information creates as much utility as highest complexity creates disutility. Decision 
makers then are indifferent between making decisions based on zero measures or based on all 
preselected measures. The optimal fraction is xoptinfo = (α/β)1/(β-α) and only depends on α and β. If 
A < Β, complete information creates less utility than highest complexity creates disutility. Decision 
makers prefer making decisions based on zero measures to making decisions based on all measures. 
The optimal fraction xoptinfo is ceteris paribus smaller than in the first case. If A > B, complete 
information creates more utility than highest complexity creates disutility. Decision makers prefer 
making decisions based on all measures to making decisions based on zero measures. Uinfo,net(x) 
becomes zero only once in [0;1]. The optimal fraction xoptinfo is ceteris paribus higher than in the first 
case. For certain constellations of α and β (see Figure 1 on the right), Uinfo,net(x) could have its 
maximum x*info outside the interval [0;1]. With x being restricted to this interval, the optimal fraction 
then is xoptinfo = 1. This is the only case where it may be informationally optimal to select all measures. 
3.2 An extended model for the informational and the economic perspective 
In reality, information is not for free. Hence, it is necessary to integrate an economic perspective. In 
order to support decision makers, measures need to be compiled into reporting tools (e. g. management 
cockpits and dashboards). These need to be customized and maintained during their time in use. 
Abstracting from fixed costs, this leads to one-time and continuous payments. Both create economic 
disutility and influence measure selection. Thus, there is a joint informational and economic trade-off. 
The question is: Up to which optimal fraction of measures does the additional informational net utility 
justify the additional economic disutility due to higher present-value payments for customization and 
maintenance? The extended model additionally relies on the following assumptions: 
A.4: All preselected measures are implemented and their values can be extracted automatically 
from the respective application systems. The consolidated DSS will be connected to the 
existing application systems.  
A.5: Decon(x) is the economic disutility due to the present-value payments for customizing and 
maintaining reporting tools. It is a function of x and can be forecast ex ante. 
                                              
1 To simplify matters, β is viewed as average value of how well decision makers/reporting tools are able to cope with 
information complexity. Of course, it can be further refined with respect to different groups/types or even individual decision 
makers/reporting tools. 
On the assumptions A.1 to A.5, the informationally and economically optimal fraction xoptinfo+econ can 
be determined by optimizing the difference between Uinfo,net(x) and Decon(x). This difference is also 
called joint informational and economic net utility Uinfo+econ,net(x). The objective function is given by: 
 Uinfo+econ,net(x) = Uinfo,net(x) - Decon(x) = Uinfo(x) - Dinfo(x) - Decon(x) = max! (5) 
To formulate the extended optimization model, Decon(x) is examined. According to A.4, payments for 
systems integration and data collection need not be considered. The more measures are selected, the 
more time consuming – and expensive – is it to initially customize reporting tools. Imagine the 
selected measures had to be integrated into a dashboard. If only one measure is selected, the dashboard 
can be customized easily. If two measures are selected, an overall layout is more difficult (but still 
easy) to find. The more measures are selected, the overproportionally more time-consuming – and 
expensive – is it to find an adequate overall layout. This includes choosing among different 
visualization elements, adapting their size, trying different layouts, or – in the worst case – changing 
the reporting tool. This also applies to the present-value payments for maintaining reporting tools. 
These arise e. g. from updating ETL procedures, assuring data quality, or changing selected measures. 
According to Axson (2007), in average 15 to 20 % of the selected measures will have to be changed 
during the first year, 10 to 15 % in the following years. Hence, the more measures are selected – that 
is, the higher x is –, the higher is the economic disutility and the higher is the marginal disutility. 
Mathematically spoken, Decon(x) is strictly increasing (∂(Decon(x))/∂x>0) and strictly convex 
(∂2(Decon(x))/∂x2>0). This may be formalized as follows: 
 Decon(x) = xγ⋅C with γ ∈ ]1;∞[ and C ∈ IR+ (6) 
Selecting no measures does not lead to payments (Decon(0) = 0), whereas selecting all measures leads 
to highest payments (Decon(1) = C). The constant C represents the highest amount of present-value 
payments due to customization and maintenance of reporting tools. The increasing marginal disutility, 
which was introduced above and is caused by a higher fraction of measures, is formalized by the fact 
that the exponent γ is restricted to ]1;∞[. A value close to 1 is appropriate if a small fraction of 
measures already leads to high payments and each measure causes approx. the same marginal 
disutility. The higher γ is, the less payments and marginal disutility causes a small fraction of 
measures and the higher is the marginal disutility of higher fractions. Based on (4) to (6), the extended 
optimization model is as follows: 
 Maximize Uinfo+econ,net(x) = Uinfo(x) - Dinfo(x) - Decon(x) = xα⋅A - xβ⋅B - xγ⋅C 
 w. r. t. x ∈ [0;1] (7) 
Although there is no general algebraic solution, the course of Uinfo+econ,net(x) and the position of 
xoptinfo+econ can be discussed with respect to the component functions (see Figure 2). As Uinfo,net(x) is 
concave and Decon(x) is convex, Uinfo+econ,net(x) is concave with one global maximum at x*info+econ. As 
Uinfo+econ,net(x) equals Uinfo,net(x) diminished by Decon(x), the joint informational and economic optimum 
xoptinfo+econ is smaller than or equal to xoptinfo, that is, xoptinfo+econ ∈ ]0;xoptinfo]. This is reasonable because 
xoptinfo is determined on the assumption that information has no price. If Decon(x) is close to zero – e. g. 






















Figure 1.  Exemplary courses of Uinfo(x), Dinfo(x), and Uinfo,net(x) 
effects. Then xoptinfo+econ and xoptinfo are approx. equal. If Dinfo(x) is close to zero – e. g. for large β and/or 
very small B –, decision makers are hardly susceptible to information complexity and/or powerful 
reporting tools are employed. Then an approx. solution is xoptinfo+econ ≈ (A⋅α/C⋅γ)1/(γ-α). In this case, 
analogous to above, the relationship between the decision makers’ subjective attitude towards 
complete information and highest (present-value) payments can be analyzed with respect to A and C. 
Concluding, the optimization model allows determining the optimal fraction of measures to be chosen 
from a preselected set of thematically appropriate measures. Accordingly, those measures are selected 
that together create the highest informational utility. The model integrates an informational and an 
economic perspective. The former reflects the decision makers’ attitude towards information and 
information complexity. The latter considers present-value payments for customizing and maintaining 
reporting tools. It could be shown that, in general, the selection policies of all-or-none or the-more-the-
better, which are often implemented in business practice, are reasonable neither from an informational 
nor from a joint informational and economic perspective. What makes sense instead is a differentiated 
and balanced selection of measures. 
4 EVALUATION 
4.1 Applying the optimization model in business practice 
The optimization model was developed in the context of a project at the German business-to-business 
sales organization of a global electronics and electrical engineering company. As there were only few 
measures, the model could be applied in a discretized form. If there had been very much measures, we 
would have had to evaluate a manageable subset in order to infer the continuous functions introduced 
above. Due to confidentiality, all data is anonymized and modified. Yet the principal results still hold. 
The project’s overall goals were to better support the sales force, to reduce IT operation costs, and to 
modernize sales reporting. As for the first two goals, the company decided to introduce a single CRM 
system and to harmonize the application landscape, which consisted of more than one hundred 
division-specific legacy systems. The reporting mainly consisted of financial and lagging measures 
such as volume of sales and price margin. It was to be modernized with respect to non-monetary and 
leading measures. Our task was to structure the salespeople’s IR into CSFs and to select appropriate 
measures. At first, candidate CSFs were identified by explorative interviews with sales managers and 
senior members of the CRM board. Sales managers had usually worked as sales representatives for 
several years and were supposed to provide valuable hints with respect to IR and sales reporting. They 
were selected by reputational methods (Knoke 1993). For each candidate CSF, several items were 
identified and compiled into a five-point Likert scale-based questionnaire. After a pretest, the 
questionnaire was presented to 25 sales managers (the amount was restricted by the project budget). 
All in all, CSFs were identified for 3 perspectives, namely organizational structures and processes 
(e. g. long-term customer care, cross-divisional cooperation), salespeople’s skills and knowledge (e. g. 
with respect to installed base and competitors’ portfolios), and IT functionality (e. g. integration with 
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Figure 2.  Exemplary course of Uinfo+econ,net(x) for A = B = C 
The CSF “cross-divisional cooperation” will serve as example. Together with the sales managers, we 
retrieved 8 thematically appropriate measures. These were: fraction of converted leads2 from other 
divisions (%_leads), average overall time spent on creating leads for other divisions (∅_T_leads), 
average time spent on creating one lead (∅_T_lead), number of trainings on other divisions’ portfolios 
(#_trainings), number of meetings with colleagues from other divisions (#_meetings), number of sales 
calls with colleagues from other divisions (#_calls), number of shared customers (#_customers), 
number of bids for customers of other divisions (#_bids). All measures had existed for several years 
and were reported monthly on a sales manager’s granularity.  
First, we assessed informational utility Uinfo(x). The exponent α – which indicates how the measures 
interdepend – was operationalized based on Pearson’s correlation coefficient. That is, we treated the 
interdependencies as pairwise, symmetric, and linear. We accepted this simplification because the 
correlation coefficient is an intuitive, widely used, and relatively easy-to-compute measure. Moreover, 
linear interdependencies are often considered as sufficiently good approximations for many economic 
settings (Edwards 1976). This turned out to be useful because, due to missing hierarchical and logic 
structures, the existence and strength of interdependencies among non-monetary and leading measures 
often need to be assessed empirically e. g. by interviewing domain experts and analysing historical 
data (Küpper 2005). Let M = {m1, m2, …, mn} comprise n preselected and thematically appropriate 
(metrically scaled) measures between some of which there are meaningfully interpretable 
interdependencies/correlations. We considered absolute values as the correlation coefficient’s 
algebraic sign only indicates direction, not strength. The values are represented as n×n-matrix CM 
where cij indicates how strong mi and mj correlate and where cij = 0 if mi and mj are statistically 
independent or if their interdependency/correlation cannot be meaningfully interpreted (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n,  
i ≠ j). The individual correlations of a measure mi equal the i-th column vector of CM. 
 ci = (ci1, ci2, …, cin)T (8) 
The joint correlations of multiple selected measures m1,…,mi (without loss of generality) are also 
represented as vector c1,…,i. The elements of all selected measures are 1 (perfect autocorrelation). The 
element of each non-selected measure indicates the strongest correlation with any measure selected so 
far. This is reasonable because if decision makers want to estimate the value of a non-selected measure 
mj, they will reasonably revert to the selected measure that correlates most strongly with mj. 
 c1,…,i = (max{c11,…,ci1}, max{c12,…,ci2}, ..., max{c1n, …,cin})T  (9) 
The concept of joint correlations enables to formalize a discretized informational utility as function of 
x. We need the highest joint correlation of x⋅n measures. It is determined by calculating the highest 
scalar product value 〈1,cx〉 where 1 is an n-vector (1, 1, …, 1)T and cx is the joint correlations vector of 
x⋅n arbitrary measures. Dividing the scalar by n normalizes it to [0;1]. This operationalization can be 
interpreted as a monetized mean absolute correlation. 
 Uinfo(x) = [max { 〈1,cx〉 | x⋅n measures are selected } / n] ⋅ A (10) 
After CSF analysis, some sales managers from the CRM board were asked to (subjectively) judge 
which interdependencies between measures are meaningfully interpretable as regards the sales 
domain. The strength of these interdependencies was calculated by means of absolute correlation 
values based on historical data. Table 2 shows the results with the light grey cells marking excluded 
interdependencies/correlations. Concerning the value of A – which represents the sales managers’ 
present-value monetary equivalent of complete information – we asked each sales manager how many 
daily rates he would pay for having complete information on cross-divisional cooperation during the 
planning horizon. We obtained an average of 10 daily rates, which we multiplied with the sales 
                                              
2 In the CRM context, a lead represents a hint with low degree of maturity from inside or outside one’s division that refers to 
a potential customer or project opportunity.   
managers’ average daily rate of 750 € and their overall number – there were 50. We finally obtained 
A = 375,000 €. As for informational disutility Dinfo(x), the sales managers received sample reports. 
Each contained a different amount of measures, but had exactly the same layout as the reports that 
were planned to be finally used. The sales managers’ task was to entirely understand the reports. For 
each amount of measures, we logged the time. In order to determine the value of B, we used the 
average value for 8 measures – which was 2.0 hours. We normalized it with respect to the sales 
managers’ average daily working time – which was 9 hours. Then, we multiplied it with the sales 
managers’ average daily rate and their overall number. As the report was planned to be presented 
monthly and the planning horizon was 3 years, we calculated the annual payments and the 
corresponding present value with an interest rate of 10 %. Assuming that the managers had to try to 
understand the report completely anew each time they received it, we obtained B = 273,554 €. We 
used the other time values for approximating β. The sales managers coped well with a low number of 
measures, but had problems with more than approx. 4–5 measures. So we obtained β = 2.8. The 
economic disutility Decon(x) was calculated based on Boehm’s widespread cost estimation model 
CoCoMo (1981). Together with the company’s DSS experts, we parameterized the estimation model 
as PM=2.94⋅0.20⋅LOC1.2 where PM and LOC denote person months and thousand lines of code 
respectively. The present-value effort for customizing a report with one measure and maintaining it 
during the planning horizon was estimated equivalent to 1.250 LOCs. With the DSS experts’ average 
daily rate of 400 € and 20 working days per month, we obtained C = 74,553 € and γ = 1.2.  
On this basis, we determined the optimal fraction of measures xoptinfo+econ by computing the joint 
informational and economic net utility Uinfo+econ,net(x) (see Table 3 and Figure 3). If we had only 
considered the informational perspective, the highest informational net utility would have resulted 
from xoptinfo = 0.5. We would have selected the 4 measures with the highest informational utility, i. e. 
%_leads, Ø_T_leads, #_meetings, and #_customers. As we also took on an economic perspective, the 
highest joint net utility resulted from xoptinfo+econ = 0.375. We selected the 3 measures with the highest 
informational utility, i. e. %_leads, #_customers, and #_bids. Here, it becomes obvious that measures 
can be discarded if the number of selected measures changes. 
We applied the same procedure to the other CSFs. Advantageously, this caused considerably less 
effort because Dinfo(x) and Decon(x) needed not to be determined anew. Uinfo(x) could be calculated 
based on historical data so that the sales managers’ expertise was only required for preselecting 
thematically appropriate measures and identifying meaningfully interpretable interdependencies. In 
sum, we modernized the company’s sales reporting by identifying CSFs, by integrating non-monetary 
and leading measures, and by significantly reducing the overall number of measures. 
No. of selected measures 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Fraction x 0 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5 0.625 0.75 0.875 1 
Uinfo(x) [€] 0 217,969 281,719 310,781 337,500 352,969 365,156 373,125 375,000 
Dinfo(x) [€] 0 810 5,640 17,552 39,279 73,368 122,240 188,220 273,554 
Uinfo,net(x)  [€] 0 217,159 276,079 293,229 298,221 279,601 242,916 184,905 101,446 
Decon(x) [€] 0 6,148 14,125 22,978 32,451 42,415 52,789 63,515 74,553 
Uinfo+econ,net(x) [€] 0 211,011 261,954 270,251 265,770 237,185 190,127 121,390 26,893 
Table 3. (Dis-)Utility values for the CSF “cross-divisional cooperation” 
 %_leads Ø_T_leads Ø_T_lead #_trainings #_meetings #_calls #_customers #_bids 
%_leads 1.00 0.43 0.83 0.67 0.00 0.42 0.34 0.96 
Ø_T_leads 0.43 1.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.54 
Ø_T_lead 0.83 0.34 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.24 
#_trainings 0.67 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.41 0.21 
#_meetings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.25 0.12 
#_calls 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.38 1.00 0.74 0.73 
#_customers 0.34 0.12 0.36 0.41 0.25 0.74 1.00 0.58 
#_bids 0.96 0.54 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.73 0.58 1.00 
Table 2. Absolute correlation coefficient values of the preselected measures 
4.2 Checking the optimization model against the PMS requirements 
The optimization model particularly aims at closing the primary research gap with respect to clarity 
(R.2) and interdependencies (R.5) (see section 2). By requiring to select a manageable amount of 
measures, the model addresses clarity in an explicit manner. Informational disutility expresses the 
decision makers’ and reporting tools’ ability of coping with informational complexity and is 
contrasted to informational utility. Thereby, we make sure that the whole amount of information does 
not become too complex and remains manageable for the decision makers. Interdependencies are also 
addressed explicitly. This is because informational utility uses interdependencies in order to express 
how “much” information measures provide about one another. The example showed – albeit in a 
simplifying manner – how an interdependency-based informational utility can be operationalized for 
non-monetary and leading measures with Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Moreover, the model 
makes the process of measure selection more intersubjectively comprehensible (R.4). Although most 
parameters cannot be determined without subjective influences, just the fact that it is clear how they 
are formally linked increases intersubjectivity. Decision makers do not only participate by means of 
explorative interviews, but also in a structured manner by validating interdependencies and estimating 
model parameters (R.6). Concluding, the model does not only address the primary research gap, but 
also ameliorates the other PMS requirements. 
5 SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
An optimization model has been proposed that helps to determine which and how many measures 
should be selected from a set of thematically appropriate measures in order to monitor specific fields 
of action. Informational and economic objectives are considered. That is (statistic) interdependencies 
among measures, decision makers’ and reporting tools’ ability of coping with information complexity 
as well as payments for customizing and maintaining reporting tools influence measure selection. The 
model’s principle applicability was shown with a real-world example. Admittedly, business practice 
entails problems (e. g. estimation of costs, data collection in complex social contexts, decision makers’ 
partial inability of unambiguously specifying IR) that make it hard to achieve truly optimal solutions. 
In order to cope with some of these problems, it may be useful for companies to implement the model 
stepwise and to involve operating staff in data collection. Nevertheless, the proposed model is a first 
step towards a more well-founded measure selection. It will be subject to future research: 
1. The optimization model is applied to one field of action a time. Several fields of action can only 
be addressed successively and isolated. The fact that measures may be thematically appropriate for 
more than one field of action is not considered. Hence, an integrated perspective is desirable and 























Figure 3. Visualization of the (dis-)utility values for the CSF “cross-divisional cooperation” 
2. So far, only measures from existing application systems are considered. On the one hand, this is 
reasonable as in many companies more measures exist than any decision maker can ever analyse. 
On the other hand, positive effects of innovative measures are neglected and need to be integrated.    
3. (Data-driven) DSS and data warehouses do not only comprise measures, but also other master data 
for evaluation. In order to deal with their full scope, the model needs to be complemented e. g. by 
an approach which assesses relevant dimensions and dimension elements.  
4. Although the model has been employed successfully with real-world data, empirical evidence is 
missing with respect to whether its recommendations actually improve decision quality. It would 
be insightful and strengthen evaluation to conduct respective empirical studies. 
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